The politics of folklore can seem like a simple thing. It might seem inherently nationalist (as it often appears to by Westerners studying Eastern Europe). Or it can seem inherently apolitical (as Eastern Europeans sometimes see it themselves). Or inherently left-populist (as North American folkies like me often prefer to think). I’ve been trying to complicate all those views, studying folklore as a medium of powerful but underdetermined political engagement.
Folklore is a certain kind of expression (lore) connected to a certain kind of social form (the folk). And this social form is connected to politics (in the form of “the people”). “The folk” is the people when it expresses and feels; “the people” is the folk when it demands the right to speak and to will and to govern.
And then what happens if, following people like J. G. Herder, Maxim Gorky, and Jacques Rancière, we consider that the people or folk might also think, and even philosophize?
I started to approach this problem in my book The Paradox of Authenticity: Folklore Performance in Post-Communist Slovakia, in an article called “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Folk?” and in two essays reflecting on the meaning of folklore in the present (“Folklore Was Always Already Gone” and “Folklore Lives! But…”).
I’ve been continuing in a series of articles on socialist concepts of folklore, from the “new folk art” of the interwar Czech avant-garde through postwar theorists of folklore in Communist-ruled Europe. I have more articles planned, including two already half-written, on Soviet mass spectacles and folklore festivals, and on the Czech Communist search for a philosophy based on folklore.